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The nineteenth-century not only brought independence to Mexico but 
transformed many people in the country side from objects to subjects 
of history. While different constitutions of independent Mexico had 
foreseen such a change it took place in a very different way than the 
framers of those documents had expected and specified. They had 
thought of a republic of enfranchised citizens, all of whom would 
determine the character of the country through their votes and who 
would create a stable and democratic Mexico. This was not to be the 
case. 
The first massive entrance of the lower classes into the politics of 
what was then still New Spain was of a violent nature. Both Hidalgo 
and Morelos mobilized large segments of the rural populations to fight 
both for the independence from Spain and for more rights for the 
popular classes. Their defeat and execution by no means ended the 
role of the country people in shaping the destiny of Mexico.1  
The newly acquired importance of the popular classes in the coun-
tryside in Mexican politics was partly due to their role during the In-
dependence Wars. These wars had transformed their consciousness 
and taught them how to fight. These factors alone though do not ex-
plain the role that the popular classes in the countryside played in the 
history of the nineteenth-century in Mexico. One can not understand 
the developments in Mexico up to the end of the nineteenth century 
without considering the enormous weakness of the newly founded 
Mexican State. It was ravaged by constant civil wars, which made it 
impossible for any government to rule for a longer period of time and 
for the Mexican State to consolidate itself. These civil wars were of a 
multifaceted nature. At times they pitted liberals who wanted to de-
                                                     
1 I prefer to use the term country people rather than peasants since the latter term 
is not only of a controversial but also of a limited nature while the first term 
encompasses the most diverse segments of rural society. 
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centralize Mexico and to limit to the power of the church against con-
servatives who wanted a strong state modeled on the Spanish colonial 
empire with a decisive role for the church. At times they pitted re-
gional warlords against the central government. The army repeatedly 
staged coups. Frequently the state had to face popular uprisings. As if 
these convulsions from within were not sufficient, Mexico more than 
any other Latin American country became the preferred object of for-
eign aggression. In the Mexican-American war of 1846-1848 Mexico 
lost half of its territory to the United States and in the 1860s the 
French attempted to set up an empire there. 
It is thus not surprising than the Mexican State did not have the 
power of its Spanish predecessor to mediate between peasants and 
landlords. The Spanish crown had been interested in maintaining vil-
lage communities and to prevent their expropriation by large estates. 
What role idealism and humanism played in that decision is still a 
matter of controversy. What is not controversial is the fact that the 
state hoped in this way to continue levying tribute from village com-
munities, a revenue that would have been lost if these communities 
became part of large estates which paid very few taxes. The Spanish 
courts frequently heeded appeals by villagers above all Indians. By the 
end of the colonial period between 25% and 30% of arable land was 
still in the hands of free villages communities (Borah 1993). 
At the same time the Spanish authorities violently crushed village 
uprisings of which there were not too many prior to the war of inde-
pendence. The Mexican state did not have the power even if they 
wanted to use it, which is debatable, to prevent attacks of landlords on 
village communities. It did not have the power either, which it would 
have preferred to use, to always protect landlords from attacks by 
popular classes in the countryside.  
The most important way though, in which the weakness of the 
Mexican State affected the lower classes of society was that the power 
vacuum left by the national governments was largely filled by regional 
caudillos who constantly fought with each other for national power. 
Unlike the national governments which for a time seemed to have 
been overthrown practically every year, regional strong men main-
tained their power for long periods of time, sometimes ranging to 
twenty or thirty years. In their struggles for national power or in their 
endeavors to maintain their regional control and protect it from the 
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central government these regional warlords frequently made alliances 
with village communities. This was the case for both the liberals and 
the conservatives in Mexico.  
In the state of Guerrero, liberal caudillo Juan Álvarez, gained a 
large degree of popular support by protecting village communities 
from attacks by landlords and by the central government. On the other 
hand he also made sure that most landlords could retain control of 
their properties (Guardino 1996). 
In the western area of Tepic, the conservative warlord Manuel 
Lozada had created a kind of Indian republic based on Cora and Hu-
ichol Indians. Like Álvarez, Lozada guaranteed the villagers control 
of their lands and maintenance of their traditional customs. At the 
same time though Lozada had allied himself with one of the strongest 
merchant houses in the area, the Spanish establishment of Barron y 
Forbes, which exercised a decisive influence on the regions economy. 
Like Álvarez in Guerrero, Lozada too mediated between the upper and 
the popular classes. 
In very different ways landlords and free villagers coexisted in 
Northern Mexico. After conquering Northern Mexico, the Spanish 
crown had established settlements there consisting mainly of mining 
towns and large estates. These settlements had been the consistent 
object of attacks by nomadic Indians. 
In order to counteract these attacks, the Spanish crown set up mili-
tary colonies consisting of free villagers. Whoever settled these colo-
nies whether white, mestizo or indian was given the full right of Span-
ish citizenship i.e. he became a vecino. These military colonists were 
given substantial amounts of land, exemption from taxation for many 
years and not only the right but the obligation to bear arms. On the 
whole as long as the Indian wars lasted, their conflicts with neighbor-
ing large estates were extremely rare. Both sides saw nomadic Indians 
as the main enemies. In addition the value of land was limited in this 
period. This was not only due to the small number of inhabitants in the 
north but also to the fact that because of poor communication and 
danger from nomadic Indians the possibilities of exporting agricultural 
goods or meat or cattle were extremely limited.2  
                                                     
2 Nugent (1988); Orozco y Orozco (1995); Alonso (1995); Katz (1998). 
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While some caudillos such as Juan Álvarez in Guerrero and 
Manuel Lozada in Tepic clearly managed to control their popular al-
lies, in other cases regional caudillos had very different experiences. 
In Sonora, local strong men who mobilized the Yaqui Indians to fight 
against rivals soon lost control of their erstwhile allies as the Yaquis 
set out to control their own destinies and their own lands. 
Politicians from Yucatan who attempted to enlist the armed sup-
port of Mayan Indians in one of their many civil wars underwent simi-
lar and in many respects even more dangerous experiences. The Maya 
turned against not only the rival caudillos but against their erstwhile 
allies and for a time it seemed as if all non Indians might be expelled 
from the Yucatan Peninsula in the caste war which shook Yucatan 
in the 1840s. While the Maya were defeated they nevertheless man-
aged to set up a quasi independent republic of their own in the south-
ern tip of Quintana Roo (Reed 2001). 
The attempts by Mexican factions to establish alliances with popu-
lar classes were by no means limited to civil wars. In the guerilla wars 
against the French invaders Mexicos liberal leaders attempted to mo-
bilize large segments of the rural population. The same was true for 
emperor Maximilian who drafted legislation to improve the lot of the 
lower classes in Mexicos countryside and especially that of the In-
dians. 
As a result of these heterogeneous alliances most village commu-
nities managed to retain control of their lands and at the same time to 
maintain a large degree of autonomy. They did so in spite of the ef-
forts of the liberal government of Mexico which introduced a clause in 
the 1857 constitution that outlawed communal property of village 
lands. The drafters of that constitution seem to have hoped that by 
dividing these lands among individual community members, a class of 
individual farmers not dissimilar to those of the United States would 
emerge. What some of them did not anticipate and others may have 
hoped for was that in many cases the dissolution of the village com-
munities and the end of their traditional prohibition of land sales 
might lead to the acquisition of many of these lands by outsiders many 
of them landlords or merchants. 
The situation of Mexicos country people changed dramatically in 
1876 when Porfirio Díaz staged a coup and set up a dictatorship that 
went on to last for thirty four years. He put an end to civil wars and 
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created the first genuinely strong state in the history of independent 
Mexico. This state owed its strength to several factors. The first and 
perhaps the most important of these factors was that Mexico now be-
came part of the world capitalist order. Exports and imports increased 
enormously as did foreign investments. One of the most important 
keys to this development was the construction of a railroad network in 
large parts of Northern and Central Mexico. As a result Mexican 
products could now be transported far more cheaply both to the 
United States and to the port of Veracruz. 
The increasing revenues that the Central government received as a 
result of this rapid economic expansion allowed it to set up a strong 
bureaucracy and a strong army. Thanks to the railroads that army 
could rapidly be transported to many parts of Mexico and thus fore-
stall or defeat any uprising. 
It was of equal importance that the incentives for regional cau-
dillos to rise up against the central government diminished dramati-
cally. All of them profited both directly and indirectly from the in-
crease in foreign investments. Some of them became intermediaries 
for foreign capitalists but even if this was not the case many landown-
ers now found new markets for their products in other parts of Mexico 
and outside of the country. Any violent upheaval would have pre-
vented foreign investments and rebellious caudillos would have paid a 
high economic price, not to speak of the personal risk they would have 
incurred, if they had attempted to arise against the existing govern-
ment.  
While Mexicos upper classes now had less incentive than ever 
before to attack the central government or to fight each other their 
incentive to turn against the popular classes increased by leaps and 
bounds. Land values rose as a result both of the construction of rail-
roads and the ensuing economic boom. As landlords turned more and 
more to cultivation of cash crops their needs for supplementary labor 
increased. One of the best sources of such labor was constituted by the 
inhabitants of communal villages once they had lost all or part of their 
land and were forced to work on neighboring estates in order to sur-
vive.  
While attacks on communal village lands had been difficult as 
long as the Mexican government was weak and the landlords could 
count on very limited support from that government the situation 
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changed greatly under Porfirio Díaz. Rebellions by villagers could 
now be much more easily quelled by government troops and many 
caudillos who in the past had needed the help of neighboring villages 
to fight against their rivals no longer needed that help. 
Under Porfirio Díaz the hitherto strongest in most effective attacks 
against the properties and rights of Mexicos lower classes took place. 
The nature of these attacks was highly heterogeneous. They were very 
different from area to area both in kind and in intensity. 
There is little doubt that the greatest attacks on villages communi-
ties occurred in areas where railroads were built and land values cor-
respondingly rose, areas where cash crop production greatly increased 
and in areas of massive cattle exports. In northern Mexico the states of 
Chihuahua and Durango were particularly affected. In Chihuahua a 
profound transformation of the social and economic situation of the 
state had taken place in 1884. In that year the first railway line linking 
the state both to the United States and to Central Mexico went into 
operation. In that same year the danger of attacks from nomadic 
Apache Indians was dramatically reduced when the most important 
Apache leader, Geronimo, was captured by American troops. There 
was a huge wave of American investment both in land and mines in 
Chihuahua. The demand for agricultural products and cattle rose and 
land values increased. On the other hand since the Apache wars had 
ended neither the hacendados none the state authorities needed the 
fighting power of the former military colonists anymore. The result 
was a concerted attack both on their properties and on their traditional 
municipal autonomy. Hitherto communally owned lands were forcibly 
offered up for sale after a land law was passed by the oligarchy in 
1905. The beneficiaries of these forcible sales and a times out right 
expropriations were not always identical. At times there were direct 
land expropriations by hacendados. This was the case when the Ha-
cienda de Sombreretillo in Durango owned by the López Negrete fam-
ily confiscated the lands of San Pedro Ocuila and forcibly evicted the 
former inhabitants from their houses. In other cases the beneficiaries 
could be merchants as in the case of the former military colony of 
Janos in Chihuahua. Frequently wealthy inhabitants of villages not 
dissimilar to the Russian Kulaks, allied themselves with neighboring 
estates and began to expropriate traditional village lands as was the 
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case in the frontier settlement of Cuchillo Parado in Chihuahua (Ko-
reck 1985). 
A further blow to Mexicos free villages was constituted by the 
survey and sale of Mexicos vast public lands. In order to gain some 
measure of control over lands that officially belonged to the govern-
ment, the Díaz administration commissioned surveying companies to 
survey all of the lands considered public. In return they would receive 
one third on these lands. It has often been stated that these surveys 
resulted in massive expropriations of free villagers which had settled 
on these lands and did not have any official title to them. Recent re-
search tends to disprove this idea (Holden 1994).  
While some villagers were no doubt expropriated in many cases 
their lands were respected. That does not mean though, that the gov-
ernment measures taken with regard to public lands did not affect 
Mexicos free peasants. Before the surveys began anyone had access 
to good grazing lands and wild cattle on public lands. Once the sur-
veys were completed many of these lands were privatized. Both the 
surveying companies and the government sold them to large investors 
and landowners. The attacks on the popular classes in the countryside 
were not limited to free villages but encompassed residents of hacien-
das as well. On many estates tenantry terms became much worse. In 
addition on a number of estates the best lands were now worked by 
the hacienda itself and many share croppers were relegated to mar-
ginal lands which were dependent on the highly irregular rainfall in 
many parts of Mexico. 
In Southeastern Mexico above all in Chiapas, Tabasco and Yuca-
tan there was a resurgence and expansion of conditions of debt peon-
age that in many senses were akin to slavery. The implementation of 
these attacks on the country people did not proceed without meeting 
significant degrees of resistance. Part of that resistance took place 
within the existing political and judicial system. Village communities 
complained to high officials in the Díaz government and to Díaz itself. 
They recurred to the courts and at times had their complaints printed 
in the weak and in some respects sporadic opposition press. To no 
avail. In most cases Díaz refused to intervene and told the complain-
ants to resort to the courts. In the Spanish colonial period the courts 
were above all instruments of the Spanish crown and not of the do-
mestic oligarchy in New Spain. As a result they frequently took deci-
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sions contrary to the wishes of Mexicos criollos. In the Díaz period 
the links between the domestic oligarchy and the courts were much 
closer and thus the lower classes could expect very little help from the 
courts. In desperation in the 1890s many villagers resorted to armed 
uprisings. They were mercilessly crushed. Not only was the Díaz ad-
ministration far stronger than any preceding Mexican government but 
the country people had lost the support of their traditional caudillo 
allies who had made their peace with Díaz and were mainly interest-
ing in profiting from the new opportunities for enrichment that Mex-
icos rising economy provided. One of the means most resented by 
people in the countryside that the government applied against them 
was the end of their traditional autonomy. In much of Mexico villag-
ers could not elect their own mayor and local authorities which were 
now imposed on them by officials directly responsible to the central 
government and to the governors, the jefes políticos.  
Not all parts of Mexico were equally affected by these attacks on 
the country people. In the Western state of Jalisco significant amounts 
of lands belonged to a kind of agrarian middle class, the rancheros. 
These were frequently descendants of Spanish conquerors who had 
acquired family sized parcels of lands and owned their lands individu-
ally. Legally the Díaz administration could not undertake any meas-
ures against them. Nor were they interested in doing so. They were 
part to a large degree of Mexicos modern economy. 
In Nuevo León military colonies had also emerged up during the 
Spanish colonial period but unlike Chihuahua no great efforts were 
made to expropriate their lands. One of the main reasons for this de-
velopment was doubtless the fact that Nuevo Leóns oligarchy, con-
centrated above all in the city of Monterrey, mainly consisted of in-
dustrialists and financiers who had little interest in land.  
In Northern Mexico as well as in areas of the south close to large 
cities, expropriated villagers were able in economic terms to make up 
for their loss of lands by finding work elsewhere. In the North many 
began to work in the newly developed mines and in railway construc-
tion. In addition many migrated to the United States either on a tem-
porary or permanent basis.  
In the South in areas such as Morelos close to the capital others 
tried to find work in the large cities. When in 1907 the recession that 
began in the United States spilled over into Mexico many of these 
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people faced a disastrous situation. They had lost the land, which had 
been their main means of subsistence and now they had lost the alter-
native employment that had allowed them to survive. It is thus not 
surprising that when a wealthy land owner from Northern Mexico, 
Francisco Madero, called for a massive uprising against the dictator-
ship of Porfirio Díaz and in his platform included a demand that lands 
confiscated from villagers be returned to them, he found massive sup-
port in Mexicos countryside. 
This support by no means encompassed all of Mexico and was 
concentrated in certain areas on the country which had been the hot-
beds of agrarian discontent. In Chihuahua the core of the revolution-
ary army consisted of former military colonists who had either lost 
some or all of their lands and grazing areas for their cattle. They also 
deeply resented their loss of municipal autonomy which they had en-
joyed for nearly two centuries. In the Laguna area of Durango and 
Coahuila they were joined by many hacienda laborers. In Morelos it 
was above all inhabitants of communal villages who had suffered in 
one way or the other from the expansion of the large sugar estates who 
revolted. In all of these areas the revolution did not take the form of a 
spontaneous uprising but had been prepared by a large scale political 
awakening of the popular classes. For reasons that would go beyond 
the scope of this paper, Díaz in his last years in office had opened up a 
certain political space. As a result Madero could campaign in many 
parts of Mexico and set up his anti-reeleccionist party. While Madero 
and his party suffered frequent reprisals prior to the election of 1910 
they still enjoyed a measure of freedom. 
In Morelos it was not Madero but a gubernatorial candidate, Fran-
cisco Leyva, who managed to mobilize large segments of the country 
people. In the Leyva campaign many villagers came into contact with 
each other and bonds were created which would help in the ensuing 
revolution. An active participant in this campaign was a leader of the 
community of Anenecuilco, Emiliano Zapata. Most of the communi-
ties that revolted had an old fighting tradition. In the North it was a 
tradition of combat against nomadic Indians. In the South and above 
all in Morelos that tradition went further back to the struggle against 
the French invaders and the supporters of Maximilians ill-fated em-
pire. 
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In the North the literacy rate was among the highest in Mexico and 
while many communities were isolated by large distances and even 
separated by deserts from each other, opposition newspapers such as 
the Correo de Chihuahua allowed people in the country side to com-
municate with each other. In Morelos the closeness of most villages to 
each other accelerated communications. In the North thanks to the 
border with the United States revolutionaries had no great difficulty in 
acquiring arms. In the South this problem was more difficult but the 
closeness of Morelos to the city of Mexico also made it possible to 
buy weapons though this was a much more difficult undertaking than 
in the North. 
In the North the uprising was led to a large degree by rebellious 
members of the upper class, above all Francisco I. Madero himself or 
by José María Maytorena in Sonora. In the South there were no revo-
lutionary landowners and the middle class was small and under devel-
oped and thus the leadership of the revolution was assumed by coun-
try men such as Emiliano Zapata and Genovevo de la O. 
With some exceptions this first phase of the revolution was not 
radical in nature in the sense that there were no massive occupations 
of hacienda lands and no massacres of land owners or hacienda ad-
ministrators. Surprisingly very few jacqueries took place. Many parts 
of Mexico especially the countrys Southeast were largely unaffected 
by Maderos revolution. In the latter areas the control of the hacenda-
dos was so pervasive, the isolation of peons from each other so great, 
that participation in the revolution was sporadic and minimal. 
The participants in what I would call the second wave of revolu-
tion in Mexico which lasted from late 1911 through the overthrow of 
Madero in February of 1913 were disillusioned revolutionaries of the 
first wave. They deeply resented the fact that Madero had not com-
plied with the promise he had made in the Plan de San Luis Potosí to 
return lands confiscated from the popular classes to their former own-
ers. In addition many of the revolutionaries had been led to believe 
that in one or the other way profound social changes in their favor 
would take place. When nothing of the kind happened and on the con-
trary the federal army attempted to demobilize the revolutionary army 
by force and began a policy of persecution not only of former revolu-
tionaries but of their families as well, Emiliano Zapata broke with the 
Madero government. He issued the Plan de Ayala which demanded 
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the return all lands taken from villages and the division of one third of 
estate lands among the village communities. In the North, particularly 
in the states of Chihuahua and Durango disillusioned veterans of the 
Madero revolution also rose up in arms. No one has better expressed 
these feelings than the British consul in Durango: 
promises had been made to the men as inducement to enroll, by the lesser 
leaders; future large increases in wages, apportionment of land and other 
impossible benefits were not considered to be too extravagant or im-
proper assurances when men were needed. Mr. Madero and his lieuten-
ants have not found it easy to satisfactorily explain the non-compliance, 
nor why further patience must be exercised in these matters; the rank and 
file are feeling that the only real vestige of these promises is the resent-
ment that non-fulfillments have left in their minds. Many state that they 
are victims of deception and injustice. 
The revolt in the North though was far more complex than its counter-
part in the South where the leadership clearly and unequivocally came 
from the lower classes of society. In the North the leader of the revolt 
Pascual Orozco who had also been the main military leader of the 
Maderista revolution in Chihuahua had allied himself with some of the 
wealthiest hacendados in Chihuahua. The latter were willing to take 
the risk of the popular revolution because they felt that Pascual 
Orozco could control it. If not, they hoped that the revolution would 
be defeated and the federal army would return to the North. As a result 
of the Madero revolution most federal troops had been withdrawn 
from that area and the oligarchy hoped that their return would clearly 
allow the areas upper classes to maintain their traditional control over 
these areas.  
The Orozco revolt was defeated and he lost the support of many of 
the radical countrymen who had joined him. They felt that Orozco had 
betrayed them. Others reverted to banditry.  
The third wave of revolution was very different of the first two, in 
that it was not organized and frequently comprised groups that had 
scarcely participated in the first two waves of revolt i.e. hacienda-
peons. The victory of the Madero revolution and the obvious weak-
ness of the traditional Mexican state produced the most different kinds 
of resistance. Some times resistance simple meant saying no to the 
hacienda on subjects that the peons had hitherto fully accepted. A 
characteristic expression of such of an attitude were the events on a 
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British owned hacienda Dos Bocas in the state of Oaxaca where no 
major revolutionary movement had occurred in 1910-1911. 
Sometime in the nineteenth century, a Mexican landowner, Gen-
eral Mejía, owner of the hacienda of Dos Bocas, seized lands belong-
ing to the peasant village of Zoquiapan with the help of the courts. 
The Indians appeared and still appear to believe, the British Consul 
reported on these events to the Foreign Office in London, 
that they possess inherent rights to till these ancient communal lands, as 
they were tilled by their fathers and grandfathers, and hold the theory that 
they were wrongfully abdicated to the estate. They seem, nevertheless, or 
at all events, some of them, to have acquiesced more or less grudgingly, 
in the altered conditions, and to have been satisfied with the status of 
colonists, or settlers on the land, provided that certain lapses on their 
part, such as permitting their cattle to stray about the plantation, were not 
too closely inquired into. 
General Mejía was obviously an old-line cacique who believed that a 
certain amount of flexibility and give and take was necessary to keep 
his peons in line and to prevent them from becoming desperate and 
thus resorting to desperate means. His British son-in-law who inher-
ited the estate, Woodhouse, had no such beliefs. In respect to such 
matters as these, the British Minister to Mexico stated in diplomatic 
terms, 
it is contended that Mr. Woodhouse has shown some want of tact and 
that, by adopting a more conciliatory attitude in dealing with ignorant In-
dians, who considered that they have been defrauded of their lands, al-
though not directly by Mr. Woodhouse himself, much friction might 
have been avoided. 
In the same diplomatic vein, the British Minister concluded, the pe-
culiar position of the settlers on his estate would appear to entitle them 
to be treated with a greater measure of forbearance than ordinary ten-
ants would have the right to expect.  
When some of the hacienda laborers who showed sympathy for 
the revolution (although they had never participated in it) were shot 
and wounded by the owner of the plantation, Woodhouse, and were 
later arrested by soldier a rebellion broke out on the hacienda and 
peons assumed control over the estate. An observer sent by the state 
government to evaluate conditions at the hacienda of Dos Bocas re-
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turned that by stating all the troubles complained by Mr. Woodhouse 
are more or less chronic on all haciendas in the state of Durango.3 
In other cases large scale strikes of hacienda peons occurred de-
manding not only higher wages but for these wages to be paid in 
money and not in scrip only redeemable at the company store. In other 
cases many disillusioned country men resorted to banditry.  
While the reaction of the Madero administration to the second 
wave of revolts was clearly antagonistic his attitude towards the third 
wave was far more differentiated and nuanced Maderos government 
tolerated many of the strikes and in many cases of conflicts within the 
haciendas as in Oaxaca, it carried out attempts of mediation.4 
The Madero administration also legalized some of the changes that 
inhabitants of communal villages had sought for a long time: the right 
to elect their own officials. Some times these newly elected authorities 
tried to reverse some of the land expropriations that had taken place in 
the Díaz period. With few exemptions they did not touch the hacien-
das but they did attempt to reverse some of the expropriations carried 
out by local strong men, merchants or wealthier peasants. It is not 
clear how the Madero government reacted to this type of local change. 
On the whole while the three waves of revolt and social move-
ments had eroded the power of the traditional oligarchy and the power 
of the hacendados in much of Central and Northern Mexico that ero-
sion was still very limited in scope. The vast majority of hacendados 
still controlled their lands and the Madero government had made no 
move to, in any way radically alter the agrarian status quo. 
That situation would change dramatically in what I would call the 
fourth wave of the revolution. In February of 1913 Mexican conserva-
tives with help of the Mexican Federal army and U.S. ambassador 
Henry Lane Wilson toppled the Madero government and established a 
military dictatorship headed by federal commander Victoriano Huerta. 
The attempts by the Mexican military to crush rural revolutionary 
movements once and for all were completely unsuccessful. On the 
contrary a fourth wave of revolutions now occurred. While in Morelos 
it represented a continuity with the second wave, in the North entirely 
                                                     
3 Prefect of Etla to state government, January 31, 1911, enclosed with message 
from Francis William Stronge, British minister to Mexico, of February 20, 1912, 
PRO, FO 37371-1396-11269-3738. 
4 Ibid. 
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new revolutionary movements arose. Not only were these new revolu-
tionary armies more powerful than their Maderista predecessors but 
also far more radical. As these armies advanced southward large 
groups of Mexican hacendados fled, since many had identified them-
selves with the Huerta dictatorship. Only foreign land owners whose 
properties the revolutionaries respected because they needed access to 
arms from the United States and hacendados such as the Madero fam-
ily who had thrown in their lot with the revolutionaries remained. 
The disappearance of the old army, the old authorities as well as 
the flight of the hacendados created a partial power vacuum. This 
power vacuum was enhanced by the civil war between the revolution-
ary factions that engulfed Mexico from the latter part of 1914 through 
1915 which prevented any stable government from emerging in im-
portant parts of Mexico. 
The consequences of this power vacuum for the countryside and 
how it was filled remain one of the most controversial problems in the 
historiography of Mexico. On the whole this period of power vacuum 
was characterized by a tremendous heterogeneity. In the areas con-
trolled by Emiliano Zapata the leader of the liberating army of the 
South, the land of the large haciendas were divided among the adjoin-
ing villages and political power reverted to the pueblos as well as to 
the leadership of the Zapatista army. While important differences did 
exist between villages in Morelos and in adjoining areas, on the whole 
the territories controlled by the Zapatistas showed the greatest degree 
of homogeneity within the revolutionary zones of Mexico. 
In the areas controlled by the other important movement with a 
lower class leadership that of Pancho Villa conditions were far differ-
ent and far more heterogeneous (Katz 1998: 397-633). Villas main 
policy with regard to the land was to confiscate the properties of the 
large estates and have them administered by the state. The revenues 
would be used to finance both the revolution and to provide cheap 
food to people in the cities as well as to help the poor, the unemployed 
and the widows and orphans of his soldiers. These confiscations were 
linked to the promise to divide these lands once the revolution tri-
umphed among the soldiers of his army and to return confiscated 
lands to their former owners. While this was Villas official policy 
which was applied in much of Chihuahua, in reality conditions within 
the Villista coalition were far more heterogeneous. One of the main 
Agrarian Movements during the Mexican Revolution 473
characteristics of that coalition was that Villa allowed his allies out-
side of Chihuahua to have a great degree of autonomy and leeway. 
The result of that policy is perhaps best described by looking at the 
situation in the state of Durango. In the most fertile part of the state, 
the Laguna, which embraced both Durango and Coahuila many of 
the large cotton producing haciendas were confiscated from their for-
mer owners and administered by the state and the revenues went to the 
state treasury. In another part of Durango Villas old crony from ban-
dit days, Tomas Urbina, appropriated the Hacienda of Canutillo and 
the surrounding town of Las Nieves. John Reed an American corre-
spondent who visited Canutillo wrote: 
I went out at dawn and walked around Las Nieves. The town belongs to 
General Urbina  people, houses, animals and immortal souls. At Las 
Nieves he and he alone wields the high justice and the low. The towns 
only store is in his house (Reed 1969: 57). 
By contrast in a third part of Durango centered around the town of 
Cuencame and controlled by the troops of Calixto Contreras, a very 
different situation existed. Contreras was a traditional leader of a vil-
lage community, the community of San Pedro Ocuila and for years he 
had led his people in a struggle to maintain their lands against the 
encroachment of the neighboring hacienda of Sombrerete. Once he 
assumed control of his area a large scale occupation of hacienda lands 
and division of these properties took place.  
In the areas dominated by Venustiano Carranza, an hacendado 
who led one of the strongest Mexican revolutionary factions the situa-
tion was far less heterogeneous. Carranza was fundamentally opposed 
to any kind of large scale agrarian reform and hoped to maintain the 
hacienda as an institution. Nevertheless his generals forced him to 
acquiesce to a temporary occupation of Haciendas by revolutionary 
generals who thus hoped to finance the revolution. He nevertheless 
made it clear that such occupations were only temporary and should 
never result in the division of hacienda lands. 
In contrast to the situation in the North and in much of Central 
Mexico in the countrys Southeast very different conditions impaired. 
Here no real revolution had taken place, the hacendados had not fled 
and they continued to dominate their areas. One of the factors that 
helped them to maintain this control was that a large part of the in-
habitants of the Southeast were debt peons living on haciendas and 
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kept isolated from the rest of Mexico by the land owners. In addition 
since many of the peons were Indians who did not speak Spanish 
maintaining that isolation was even easier for the hacendados. 
By the end of 1915 with the military defeat on the conventionnist 
forces (i.e. the forces led by Villa and Zapata), the situation in Mex-
icos country side once again underwent a profound change. Carranza 
who assumed power in Mexico and headed the country from 1915 to 
1920 was deeply opposed to any massive land reform. To attribute this 
opposition solely to the fact that he was an hacendado is far too a 
simple explanation. Carranza was above all a nationalist who hoped to 
modernize Mexico as rapidly as possible so that it could maintain its 
independence from the Unites States. He was profoundly convinced 
that a land reform would transform Mexicos agriculture from cash 
crop production to subsistence agriculture and thus lead to an eco-
nomic disaster for the country. As a result he waged a ruthless and 
bloody campaign against Zapata and against other radical agrarian 
revolutionaries. He returned the haciendas to their expropriated own-
ers. He thus in many respects replicated the policies that Madero had 
carried out in 1912 and 1913. There was one essential difference 
though, Carranza had to contend with the strong radical wing of his 
own movement that demanded land reform. In order to conciliate 
these radicals Carranza agreed to substantial legislation that for the 
first time in Mexicos history included land reform as part of the coun-
trys constitution. Article 27 of the new constitution which the Mexi-
cans congress enacted in 1917 stated that communities had the right to 
demand lands from the large estates to be distributed among them. 
While Carranza had no intention of applying these laws and never did 
apply them, they nevertheless had profound consequences. They cre-
ated a mobilization among peasants who met and circulated petitions 
to the government to demand the division of neighboring hacienda 
lands. Important segments of Mexicos rural classes were thus politi-
cized and these movements constituted the embryo of political peasant 
organizations that were to emerge a few years later. These peasant 
mobilizations also created a counterforce to hacendados who recov-
ered their properties which had been confiscated by revolutionary 
armies. They never managed to recover the influence over their peons 
and neighboring free villagers that had been theirs before the outbreak 
of the revolution. 
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There was one kind of social movement that Carranza and his 
government initiated that I would call the fifth wave of the Mexican 
revolution in the countryside. This movement was centered in Mex-
icos Indian Southeast. The hacendados of that area whose power was 
still intact were very wary of Carranza and his government. In view of 
his radical legislation some of them feared that he might implement 
these laws. Others did not want to share power with the central gov-
ernment. Others still, who may not have believed in the sincerity of 
Carranzas agrarian radical legislation did have a serious divergence 
with Carranza with regard to debt peonage. As a convinced capitalist 
Carranza did not believed in conditions of semi slavery and greatly 
and sincerely opposed the institution of debt peonage that was so 
prominent in Mexicos southeastern regions. When the hacendados of 
Mexicos southeast refused to subordinate themselves to his govern-
ment he sent troops to occupy these areas. This was not only due to 
his wish to control all of Mexico but also had its origins in the fact 
that some of the most important cash crops that could bring his gov-
ernment desperately needed revenue were produced in those areas. 
This was above all the case of Henequen in Yucatan whose price had 
increased by leaps and bounds after the outbreak of World War I pre-
vented the transportation of competing raw materials from Africa to 
the Unites States. 
In order to gain popular support in those areas and checkmate the 
power of the hacendados Carranzas generals once they entered the 
Southeast proclaimed the end of debt peonage. Some of the men 
charged with carrying out these policies were some of his most radical 
supporters such as Salvador Alvarado who was sent to Yucatan and 
Francisco Mugica whom Carranza sent to Tabasco. It was a conven-
ient way not only of maintaining the support of these radicals who 
were disillusioned by Carranzas conservative policies in Northern 
and Central Mexico but also of maintaining them far away from the 
center of his administration. The most successful of these radicals was 
Alvarado in Yucatan who had not only abolished debt peonage but 
sent radical instructors not dissimilar to political commissars as they 
existed in the Soviet Union, to the Haciendas to mobilize the peons 
against their owners. The result was an enormous radicalization in the 
countryside of Yucatan, that finally led to the creation of the first 
genuine radical party to emerge from the Mexican Revolution, the 
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Socialist Party of the Southeast led by one of Mexicos most interest-
ing and original ideologues, Felipe Carrillo Puerto (Joseph 1980). 
These policies were least successful in Chiapas where clientelistic 
relations between hacendados and peons on the one hand and 
depredations committed by Carranzas troops led by the relatively 
corrupt Jesús Agustín Castro, resulted in a united opposition by Indian 
peons and hacendados to the Carranza regime which prevented it from 
effectively controlling that state. 
In 1920 a new phase of the history of the Mexican Revolution be-
gan. Mexicos army led by Álvaro Obregón overthrew the administra-
tion of Venustiano Carranza. Unlike his predecessor Obregón was 
willing to make large scales concessions to rebellious countrymen in 
order to pacify the country. He signed an agreement with the Zapatis-
tas (Emiliano Zapata had been assassinated two years earlier by orders 
of Venustiano Carranza) to lay down their arms in return for being 
allowed not only to keep their lands but to have a Zapatista governor 
of Morelos. 
In the North the new Obregón government granted an amnesty to 
Pancho Villa, gave land to all of his veterans and undertook a large 
scale land reform in Chihuahua. In other parts of the country where 
rebellious countrymen where still under arms, Obregón made similar 
concessions. 
In many respects Mexicos situation in the 1920 was strangely 
reminiscent of the situation that had impaired in the country one cen-
tury earlier. The newly emerging Mexican government though not as 
weak as its predecessors a century earlier, still faced a tremendous 
amount of opposition from warlords or old line conservatives. In order 
to be able to maintain itself the new revolutionary government as well 
as caudillos i.e. warlords in different parts of the country made alli-
ances with inhabitants of free villages and frequently with their newly 
created political organizations and thus once more the peasantry en-
tered Mexican politics. 
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